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ABSTRACT 
Tracing the Development of a Theory of Language through Heidegger’s Works. (May 2015) 
 
Steven Haug 
Department of Philosophy 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Daniel Conway 
Department of Philosophy 
 
 
 
The early 20th century philosopher Martin Heidegger spends the later part of his career dealing 
in large part with questions concerning language, and the relationship between language and 
individuals. Heidegger addressed what he understood to be the dominant interpretation of the 
relationship between language and individuals, namely, that language is a tool used by humans 
as a mode of conveying information. Undoubtedly, this type of understanding is still the most 
common. Heidegger is interested in how we became creatures who understand language in this 
way. I will argue that, while he examines this, Heidegger develops his own theory of language. 
My task is to extract this theory of language, and discuss the intricacies of language, the 
individuals’ relationship to language, and the ethical concerns in regards to this relationship. I 
hope to show that the question concerning human beings and language is one that spans the 
breadth of Heidegger’s work, even though it is not expressly articulated in his earlier writings.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Pre-Socratics set out to discover the fundamental nature of reality, and in doing so they 
began the tradition of western philosophy. Thales set the standard from which later Pre-Socratics 
would follow. Aristotle, in The Metaphysics, reports what has become Thales’ largest 
contribution to western philosophy, namely, the assertion that water is the first principle.
1
 It is 
from water, argues Thales, that all things arise. That is, in its fundamental nature, reality is water. 
Later Pre-Socratics took up the idea that there was a first principle, but disagreed about what that 
fist principle was. Anaximenes and Diogenes understood air to be the fundamental nature of 
reality, while Hippasus of Metapontum and Heraclitus of Ephesus posited fire to be the 
foundational substance.
2
 
 
Thales is called the father of western philosophy because his search for an explanation and 
description of being, without resorting to mythology, has characterized a fundamental pursuit of 
western philosophy. It is in this pursuit that Plato develops his theory of Forms, and Aristotle 
develops his categories. This tradition was passed down through western intellectual history and, 
in the 20
th
 century, is picked up by Martin Heidegger.  
 
Born in Messkirch, Germany, on September 26, 1889, Heidegger grew up in a rural, religious 
community. He studied theology, then switched to philosophy in 1911, gained a position 
                                                          
1
 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, trans., Hugh Lawson-Trancred (New York : Penguin, 2004), 983b. 
2
 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 984a. 
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teaching at Freiburg in 1915, started a family, and published his magnum opus, Being and Time 
(Sein und Zeit), all before turning forty. In his early forties, Heidegger joined the Nazi party and 
became rector of the University of Freiberg. This part of Heidegger’s life is shrouded in mystery 
(perhaps soon to be unveiled with the release of his personal journals). The facts we do know do 
not shed much light on the matter. Even after the war Heidegger did not leave the Nazi party, but 
parts of his life, such as his affair with Hannah Arendt, lead us to wonder about his anti-
Semitism. Regardless of whether or not one can call Heidegger a nice guy, his genius and 
importance in the cannon of 20
th
 century continental philosophy is undoubtable.   
 
It is in Being and Time that Heidegger takes up the question of the fundamental nature of reality. 
He spends the first part of Being and Time discussing how best to approach the question of 
being. To approach this question without a point of reference, or a manifestation of being which 
he could use to guide his search, Heidegger understood that his project would never get off the 
ground. Like many philosophers before him, Heidegger places the human being in the center of 
his project, and with the human being as the foundation, delves into his search for the nature of 
being. The history of metaphysics is littered with questions that try to ascertain the being of 
certain beings. Does God exist? How do the mind and body exist in relation to one another? 
Does the table I experience in front of me exist? All of these questions posit knowledge of what 
it means to exist. Heidegger draws our attention to this oversight and points out that the 
fundamental question is: what does exist mean? 
 
My analysis unfolds in three parts. First, I provide a brief reading of Being and Time in which I 
layout key aspects of Dasein. This examination of Dasein serves as the foundation for my 
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argument that Heidegger’s later writings on language and dwelling come naturally out of Being 
and Time. The next chapter specifically addresses the transition to language and explains how 
Being and Time is part of a much larger project in which human beings’ relationship with 
language is the central focus. In the final chapter, I back away a bit from Heidegger’s text in 
order to provide an overview of his understating of the relationship between language and 
individuals. It is also in this chapter that I briefly discuss Adolf Eichmann as he is portrayed in 
Hannah Arendt’s book Eichmann in Jerusalem3, as an inauthentic individual because if his 
inability to listen to the speaking of language. This reading of Heidegger’s texts in their entirety, 
along with the brief look at the example of Eichmann as someone who has utterly succumbed to 
understanding language as enframed, will reveal the ethical concerns in Heidegger’s works.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem; a Report on the Banality of Evil, (New York: Viking 
Press, 1963). 
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CHAPTER II 
DASEIN AND BEING AND TIME 
 
When Descartes used the human being to ground his epistemology, he used the human being in 
an importantly different way than Heidegger does in Being and Time. Descartes argues that the 
one thing we can know for certain is that I exist. Using his certainty of the existence of I, 
Descartes piles other knowledge on top of this foundation. Heidegger goes deeper than Descartes 
in trying to understand just what the I is. Whereas Descartes used the human being as the axiom 
from which he could derive certainty, Heidegger uses the human being as a lens through which 
he can glimpse being. Heidegger takes care to examine this lens, which he calls Dasein. The 
German verb dasein can be translated into ‘exist’, but it can also be translated into ‘to be here/to 
be there’. Heidegger uses Dasein, a noun, to describe not only human beings, but the particular 
way in which human beings be. 
 
But why does Heidegger begin with Dasein rather than existence of a substance, like the Pre-
Socratics did, or take up Aristotle’s idea of a prime mover? He does not work his way down to 
the human being the way Descartes did, through a sort of logical derivation, but rather, he 
chooses Dasein because it is Dasein that asks the question. Because it is Dasein that proposes the 
question of being, the being of all other beings is understood through Dasein, the questioner. 
“Thus fundamental ontology,” states Heidegger in the introduction to Being and Time, “from 
which alone all other ontologies can originate, must be sought in the existential analysis of 
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Dasein [original emphasis]”.4 Heidegger goes on to explain the specific ways in which Dasein 
takes priority over all other beings when examining the question of being.  
 
The essence of a cow is to ruminate, and to use Sartre’s example, the essence of a paper knife is 
to open envelopes. Dasein, on the other hand, does not come into existence with an essence. We 
are thrown into the world then have to decide, or create, our own essence. For cows and paper 
knives, being is not a problem, but Dasein finds itself in existence without an essence. Dasein is 
left to gather itself, examine its existence, and build itself into an essence of its own creating. It is 
for this reason that the question of being is a question for Dasein in a way that it is not a question 
for any other type of being.  
 
 The “essence” of Dasein lies in its existence. The characteristics to be found in this being 
 are thus not present “attributes” of an objectively present being which has such and such 
 an “outward appearance,” but rather possible ways for it to be, and only this. All being, 
 one way or another, of this being is primarily being. Thus the term “Dasein,” which we 
 use to designate this being, does not express its what — as in the case of table, house, tree 
 — but rather being [original emphasis].5 
 
Dasein is the being of possibility. It decides its own mode, manner, and way of being. In Being 
and Time, Heidegger puts phenomenology to the task of examining what it means to exist as a 
human being. If we ask the question of being through the sciences, such as biology, chemistry, or 
                                                          
4
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans., Joan Stanbaugh, revised by Dennis J. Schmidt 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010), 12. 
5
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 41. 
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physics, we will undoubtedly get an account of what it is to be, but this account will explain the 
existence of human beings in a way that does not get at exactly how human beings exist 
differently than other beings. The sciences approach Dasein as an item that exists in no different 
way than other beings. They can tell us what we are anatomically, biologically, and 
psychologically, but they cannot get at how human beings are insofar as we exist in a different 
way than other beings. Chemistry, for example, can give an account of the chemical makeup of a 
giraffe just as easily as it could provide the chemical makeup of a human. Another short coming 
of the sciences, Heidegger points out, is that they all rely on some underlying set of principle that 
are not in themselves investigated. Biology does not ask questions about the scientific method. 
These unquestionable platforms from which the sciences formulate their theories provide only a 
shaky foundation.  
 
The humanities, or social science, gain a little more ground than the hard sciences in their 
approach to Dasein, but we have forgotten too much about human existence to access Dasein in 
the humanities’ texts. Also, the question has so long been forgotten that the authors of the texts 
read and studied in the humanities were already so displaced from human existence that they 
could not have placed what it means to be a human being in their writings. As Heidegger puts it: 
“All ontology, no matter how rich and tightly knit a system of categories it has at its disposal, 
remains fundamentally blind and perverts its innermost intent if it has not previously clarified 
the meaning of being sufficiently and grasped this clarification as its fundamental task [original 
emphasis].”6 
 
                                                          
6
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 10. 
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Phenomenology, a careful description of our own existence, is the only way to get at the question 
of being, and formulate the question of what it is to exist as a human being. It is this in-looking, 
argues Heidegger, which allows us access to Dasein. Unlike the sciences, phenomenology does 
not have its legitimacy in a foundational principle. It is self-authenticating; there is no check for 
what we find when we investigate with phenomenology. We find what we find. With 
phenomenology we are not looking outside to things like science or religion for an answer to 
what it means to be human beings, we look into ourselves and past the facades that we all hold 
up to describe our being (our career, political orientation, gender, ect…), and get at the bone of 
our being.  
 
Being and Time makes a suggestion rather than a logical argument. When Heidegger conducts 
his phenomenological investigation, he arrives at something that he argues is shared with all 
human beings. While every Dasein is an individual, we all share a certain type of care for being. 
This care is wholly our own, but each of us do care. In Being and Time, Heidegger tells us, that 
when he looks inside of himself, he finds a sea of things. But he argues that we are able to boil 
this sea of business and worry down to a base worry, the concern from which all of our other 
concerns arise. This base worry is the care [sorge] for our existence, the constant concern of 
“who am I to be?”. Care, in the sense that it is used by Heidegger, should be thought of as the 
type of care parents have for their children. They care for their children insofar as they are 
concerned with the health and wellbeing of their children, but parents also care for their children 
in that they love their children. There is a sense of taking-care-of, and a caring-about. Sorge, the 
German word that Heidegger uses, carries with it this two part meaning of care. Being and Time 
calls us to phenomenologically investigate ourselves and see if we arrive at the same things as 
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Heidegger, a sea of worries founded on an underlying care for our being. Heidegger thinks if our 
in-looking arrives at a similar conclusion as his, then Being and Time will be useful to us. This is 
the suggestion that Being and Time makes: look into yourself and discover what it is to be 
insofar as you are a human being.  
 
Human beings are the kinds of beings for whom their being is a concern. This is what 
distinguishes human beings from all other beings, and it is what we find through 
phenomenology. When bees pollinate, or build a honey comb, they are certainly busy. But the 
business of the bees is not sprung from a worry of how to be. The bees are not the kinds of 
beings for whom being is a concern. Human beings, on the other hand, cannot get through the 
day without this question rearing. ‘Are’, ‘is’, ‘was’, ‘am’, ‘were’, and ‘will’ are all forms of the 
verb ‘to be’. Every time we talk, we speak about being. The epitome of small talk, a discussion 
of the weather, expounds an account of ones experience of how the world is on that particular 
day. “It is a nice fall day”.  
 
Human beings, insofar as we look at ourselves as existing as creatures whom are haunted by the 
question of being, are Dasein. To get at Dasein, we have to look into ourselves deep enough to 
arrive at human beings as lucid beings. We have to get past the essences and get to ourselves at 
the base, at our existence as it is in preceding any essence. Getting past the understanding of 
ourselves as biological beings, or as children of God, is the only way to get at ourselves enough 
so that we can make an authentic decision about how to lead our lives, about how to exist. How 
to be is a live issue for human beings. We can unburden ourselves of this, a choice to avoid 
choosing how to lead one’s life is still a choice about leading one’s life.  
10 
 
 
In the Throws 
When Heidegger begins to unveil Dasein, he comes to understand human beings as being in a 
paradoxical state. We are the beings for whom being is a concern, and, at the same time, we are 
beings that flee from the responsibility of dealing with this concern. What he means by this is 
that human beings are always in the middle of doing something, undertaking a task that is not yet 
finished, and in being busy, we ignore the question of being, we are simply doing. Living out our 
routines does not require us to directly address the question of being, nor decide the kind of 
being one wants to be. Because of this, we find that we are usually away from ourselves. With 
our mind dispersed in thinking about all the things we have to get done now, and what we have 
to do later, we are not wholly conscious of ourselves as individual beings, as Dasein. To answer 
the question of being, one needs to be brought back into one’s self, to be free of the routine and 
become wholly one’s self.  
 
Thrownness [Geworfenheit] is the word used to describe this paradoxical state. We are thrown 
into the world and into every situation we find ourselves in. When one comes back to one’s self 
from dispersement, they discover that they are in the middle of a task, in the middle of taking 
notes, of driving, of walking. One finds that they have been thrown into these situations, and 
from these situations we throw ourselves into the next task. Constantly, we are in the throws. The 
very question that defines us as human beings, the question of being, is the question we are 
always too busy to ask. If we are not a whole, we cannot answer questions about the kind of 
being we want to be.  
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This thrownness (or facticity) is not used merely to describe the fact of our historical existence. 
For example, when Heidegger argues that one is thrown into the world, he does not mean only 
that we are born at a certain time in history. Thrownness permeates our entire existence. We are 
always already thrown. That is, I was not merely thrown into the 90s when I was born, but was 
also thrown into the situation of listening to the radio, or writing this paper, or reviewing notes 
for a class. Heidegger’s concept of thrownness must be understood as a constantly reoccurring 
event along with it being historical.  
 
This situation (that of being thrown beings) does not directly appear to us. Part of Heidegger’s 
brilliance is his ability to find this phenomenon within the human condition. He explains that 
thrownness does not manifest itself wholly as itself. That is, we experience thrownness through a 
medium, namely our moods. 
 
 
Moods 
Heidegger explains that this throwness is oriented by our moods. It is never the case that we find 
ourselves not in a mood [Stimmung]. This part of Heidegger’s philosophy should not be over 
complicated. He is using ‘mood’ rather colloquially. As in, “I am in a happy mood”, or “I am 
feeling board”. But what is important to note is that when we say we find ourselves in a mood, 
we mean it quite literally. No one decides to be in this or that mood (I cannot say to myself “be 
happy now, and become happy as a result), we discover that we are in a mood. One can work on 
one’s self to bring about a mood, or change their mood, but they do that from already within the 
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mood that they find themselves in. “The fact that moods can be spoiled and change only means 
that Dasein is always already in a mood.”7  
 
When we discover that we have been thrown, we find that we are in a mood. As briefly discussed 
in the previous section, moods are how we come to understand ourselves as thrown beings. 
Moods disclose the situation we find ourselves in, and allow us to understand what our situation 
means to us.  
 
Revealing to us that we are thrown beings is not the only task of moods. They take things one 
more step. It is only when our mood discloses our situation within the world that we are able to 
throw (or project) ourselves into the next situation. We are what one could call, in the throws. 
Moods first disclose the situation we are currently in (the situation we have found ourselves 
thrown into), and then provide the platform from which we decide what to do. Being in this or 
that mood pushes us towards our next action. It is only from this disclosideness that we are able 
to throw ourselves forward. “Mood makes manifest ‘how one is and is coming along’. In this 
‘how one is’ being in a mood brings being into its ‘there.’”8 
 
Some moods incline us to gather ourselves into a whole, whereas other moods incline us to 
disperse. By “being a whole” Heidegger means that we are conscious of our being without 
distractions. That is, when we are whole, we are not worried about what we are going to eat for 
lunch, when our next meeting is, or anything outside of our own being. When he speaks of 
                                                          
7
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 131. 
8
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 131. 
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discernment, he is talking about our state during the times we are concerned about laundry and 
grades (or anything of this sort). We are dispersed when our concern is not completely focused 
on our condition as a human being.  
 
Anger, and jealously, force us to abandon ourselves. We are angry about this or that, and we are 
jealous because of so and so. The objects that derive these feelings come from outside of our 
selves. If we are angry with someone or about something, our thoughts are not upon our self, we 
are thinking about someone else, or something else. These moods force us to abandon ourselves. 
However, when we are bored, sad, or thinking about our own death, our thoughts are directed 
towards ourselves. We are brought back upon ourselves because we are not bored about someone 
or something else; our sadness is not directed at anything (at least not in the sense that sad is 
being used here), and when we are thinking about our death we are plunged into our own being. 
These moods fold us upon ourselves and allow us to return from disbursement.  
 
Death 
Angst, for Heidegger, is the mood or feeling that best allows us to gather ourselves. This angst is 
the result of being haunted by death. All of us are marked by death; we are going to die. 
However, Heidegger does not talk about death in general; he draws a distinction between 
biological death and mortality. Biological death is the physical demise of the body, the last 
breath or the last beat of the heart. We do not experience our biological death; we cannot 
experience anything when our heart stops beating and we are no longer breathing. Because 
Heidegger is conducting a phenomenological investigation, it is no surprise that events that one 
cannot experience are of little importance to him. Mortality is the haunting of death. Unlike 
biological death, we can experience mortality and constantly do experience it. Human beings are 
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haunted by their individual mortality. Haunting is not a pursuit; it does not come from something 
external, but is rather always within. There is no corporeal object outside of us that is the threat. 
Furthermore, this threat is not actual, but rather potential. Our mortality looms over us, 
reminding us of the imminent death we are constantly approaching. It is the recognition of this 
haunting that delivers us to the mood of angst and pulls us into ourselves out of disbursement.   
 
Heidegger reveals three constituent existential structures of death. The first of these explains that 
death is the most defining feature of the individual. By defining, he means that without death, 
one would not be Dasein. It is the one thing that is, in principle, unchangeable. The second 
structure of death is that it is incalculable. One can never know when they are going to die. 
Finally, death is uncircumventable. Death is the unavoidable possibility of Dasein. In Being and 
Nothingness, Sartre objects to the idea that death is an ever looming possibility. He argues that 
rather than death being a possibility, it is the end of all possibilities. “Thus death is not my 
possibility of no longer realizing a presence in the world but rather an always possible nihilation 
of my possibilities which is outside of my possibilities.”9 In answering Sartre’s objection, it is 
helpful to recall that when Heidegger explains death as an unavoidable possibility, he is not 
talking about the physical demise of the body, but rather the haunting of death. It is mortality that 
is the constant possibility, not death insofar as it is the physical demise of the body. If we were to 
understand death purely as the latter, Sartre’s objection would be difficult to rebut, but it would 
be a stretch to argue that death, insofar as we understand it as mortality, is the end of all 
possibilities.  
                                                          
9
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans., Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1956), 537. 
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Individuals can try to avoid thinking about the fact that we are going to die, but the haunting will 
overtake us no matter how adamant we are about denying it. Frequently we act in ways which 
ignore these constituent existential structures of death. Plans are made for years down the road, 
thirty year mortgages are taken out, and we make choices in our life to secure the future we 
desire. All of these acts ignore the facts that death is what makes us human beings, that it can 
happen at any time, and that there is not a thing we can do to stop it.  
 
No matter how hard one tries to disregard death, explains Heidegger, the haunting will, from 
time to time, overtake us. The feeling that the haunting of death brings about in us is angst. 
Modern society pushes and encourages us to avoid and distract ourselves from angst. The 
structures of modern society are organized in such a way as to constantly bombard us with 
avenues through which we can take flight from the angst brought about by the haunting of death.   
 
Being-with 
Above (under Dasein and Being and Time), Heidegger’s rejection of Descartes was discussed. 
When Heidegger explains what is meant by ‘being-with’, he finds it useful to bring about 
Descartes’ understanding of what it is to be a human being in order to negatively define Dasein. 
Human beings, argues Heidegger, never exist as purely thinking beings isolated from the world. 
In rejecting this Cartesian thinking of Dasein as a substance (a substance that thinks and there for 
is), Heidegger coins the compound expression “being-in-the-world” in order to express a 
unification of the types of being that is Dasein. “...being-in-the-world is an a priori necessary 
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constitution of Desein...”10 Human beings dwell in the world before they can in any way 
participate in their own being. One has to dwell within the world if one is to find themselves in a 
mood, be haunted by death, or think. But Heidegger wants to make it clear that he does not 
mean, by Dasein being-in-the-world, that Dasein is present-at-hand. That is, he does not 
understand Dasein as an object, or a substance, in its singularity within the world, but rather, 
Dasein is always experienced as being-with.  
 
In addition to being-in-the-world, human beings are always with others. We are not the kind of 
beings that can ever be alone. “Insofar as Dasein is at all, it has the kind of being of being-with-
one-another.”11 At first glance, it would appear that this is a ridiculous assertion. Often, one 
could say, individuals are alone. Looking at Dasein through an ontological register, however, as 
Heidegger does, Dasein is always with others.  
 
We are born as no one in particular; this fact is an a priori condition of Daseins’ being-in-the-
world. This also relates to Heidegger’s idea of thrownness. By being born, we are thrown into 
disbursement (as no one in particular), and we have to grow in order to develop into a being with 
the potential for authenticity, into Dasein. In its everydayness, Dasein does what one does 
because it is what one does. “The self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish 
from the authentic self, that is, the self which has explicitly grasped itself. As the they-self, 
Dasein is dispersed in the they and must first find itself.”12  
 
                                                          
10
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 54. 
11
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 122. 
12
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 125. 
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In being a they, Dasein is disburdened from answering the who. Heidegger interchangeably uses 
“they” and “others”, but it is important to understand that the self is not excluded when these 
words are invoked. We are a part of our culture, and the way in which we carry out our everyday 
actions (the speed we walk, the distance we stand from one another when we converse, the way 
we eat, when it is appropriate to say “thank you”) is largely not oriented by answering the 
question “who am I?”, but rather we do what we do because it is what one does. It is because of 
this that H.L. Dreyfus translates das Man as “the one”.13   
 
Language 
While Heidegger devotes several texts later in his career to the topic of language, there are only a 
few pages in Being and Time that deal with the subject. Heidegger specifically makes note of 
Being and Time section 34 (the very short section that explicitly discuses language) in his 
dialogue titled “A Dialogue on Language”14. In the dialogue, Heidegger talks about a philosophy 
course he taught before the publication of Being and Time, titled “Expression and Appearance”, 
which was devoted to the discussion of language. Heidegger explains that: 
 
 The entire course remained a suggestion.  I never did more than follow a faint trail, but 
 follow it I did. The trail was an almost imperceptible announcing that we would be set 
 free into the open, now dark and perplexing, now again lightning-sharp like a sudden 
 insight, which then, in turn, eluded every effort to say it.
15
    
                                                          
13
 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, 
Division I (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990). 
14
 Martin Heidegger, "A Dialogue on Language," In On the Way to Language, trans., Peter Hertz 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 1-54. 
15
 Martin Heidegger, "A Dialogue on Language," 41. 
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This quote gives us some insight to Heidegger’s early interests and struggles with language as a 
philosophical undertaking. In section 34 of Being and Time, Heidegger explains that discourse 
(which he describes as “existential language”16) is necessary if Dasein is to exist at all. In this 
short section, Heidegger eludes to a few themes that are further developed in his later works. For 
example, he explains that the way we are in-the-world is indicated by the way we speak, and that 
“the communication of the existential possibilities of attunement, that is, the disclosing of 
existence, can become the true aim of ‘poetic’ speech.”17 What Heidegger makes clear in this 
section is that there is, at least to some extent, an interdependent relationship between language 
and Dasein.  
 
Concluding remarks on chapter II 
With the possible exception of the last few sections of Being and Time (in which other thinker’s 
understanding of time is the central focus), the text works at developing a notion of, and 
explaining, Dasein. The sub chapters above each briefly describe some of Dasein’s central traits. 
All of the Dasein’s traits revolve around what Heidegger makes clear is the aspect of Dasein that 
makes Dasein the particular kind of being that it is, namely, that Dasein Cares.  
 
We are thrown into the world through no action, or choice, of our own. In the same way that we 
find ourselves thrown into the world, we find that we are always already in a mood. Our mood, 
however, provides us with important orientation in the world. Anxiety about death is the mood 
                                                          
16
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 156. 
17
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 157. 
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which provides the opportunity for Dasein to come back upon itself in a way that allows for a 
resoluteness of the self when amongst the they. The distinction between authentic Dasein and 
inauthentic Dasein is disclosed along this line. Authentic Dasein cares about its being in such a 
way that it is resolved in its decisions, and being, not because it is doing what one does, but 
because it has gathered itself and chosen strictly for itself with an understanding of mortality and 
its own personal history.  
 
The inauthentic Dasein flees from this burden of choosing for itself and understanding that “I 
will die”. Inauthentic Dasein knows that one dies, but evades making this fate its ownmost 
possibility. Language (or discourse) plays a vital role in authentic Dasein’s being-in-the-world, 
but the details of the relationship between language and Dasein is not explained in detail in Being 
and Time. The forth coming chapter is devoted to examining a few of Heidegger’s later text in an 
effort to find the role of language in authentic being.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE LATER WORKS 
 
While it is my argument that the later writings carry on a large part of the project that Heidegger 
begins with Being and Time, we are only able to use the name “later works” because there is a 
significant change in Heidegger’s philosophical questions and writing style.  He himself called 
this point in his career the ‘kehre’, or turning. Around the mid1930s (scholars disagree on when 
exactly the line should be drawn) we divide Heidegger’s works into earlier and later. Being and 
Time constitutes the majority of his earlier work, along with many lectures. The later work 
themselves do not constitute an ideologically solidified set of works; in fact it could be argued 
that there are several turns in Heidegger’s work. The shift during the thirties, however, is such a 
change, in even the feel of Heidegger’s writing, that the tradition of drawing a line of some sort 
is appropriate.  
 
My suggestion is not that this line ought to be erased, but that understanding the line as a staunch 
division is a misunderstanding. Dasein continues to be at the heart of Heidegger’s work even 
after the kehre. The change is a result of Heidegger refining the project of Being and Time. He 
has told us that to be human is to care, but in the later writings he adds that to be human is to care 
poetically. This refined idea about exactly how human beings dwell within the world forces 
Heidegger’s writing to move from being extremely rigid, and exhaustively detailed, to almost 
fluid and shapeless. The influences of important philosophers, such as Kant and Husserl, are easy 
to find in Heidegger’s early work, but as he progresses through his career, Heidegger’s work 
resembles traditional philosophy less and less.  
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This chapter will focus on a few key texts from the later works that demonstrate a refocusing of 
what it means to be a human being. Many of the themes from Being and Time, such as alienation 
and authenticity, will resurface as we follow Heidegger’s thinking to the notion that the way 
human beings understand and interact with language defines their authenticity.  “The Question 
Concerning Technology” is a powerful and persuasive essay. It also a vital text in understanding 
how Heidegger ends up placing so much emphasis on language when it comes to human beings 
dwelling within the world. It is with this essay that Heidegger begins to explain how it is that 
human beings became beings who understand language as a tool.  
 
Heidegger, in The Question Concerning Technology, draws our attention to the fact that we have 
not looked closely enough at the things that constitute and guide our existence. Why are there 
four causes? Why is it the case that the four causes are these four and not some other four? 
Heidegger begins this essay by asking these questions, and traces the etymology of ‘cause’ in 
order to give us a sense of what we understand a cause to be. What is revealed to us is that “The 
four causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something 
else.”18 While each of the causes are different, their relationship is responsible for bringing 
something into the open. Heidegger uses the example of a silver chalice. By working together, 
the causes bring about the chalice, and present the chalice to us as being ready to use. 
Collectively, the four causes bring things into being; the chalice is brought forth from out of 
concealment into unconcealment. Here, Heidegger is beginning to tie technology to truth, which 
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he defines as unconcealment. With technology we are able to bring more and more things out of 
concealment and into being.  
 
Heidegger divides the history of being into separate epochs. In each epoch, being is understood 
in an importantly different way than in the other epochs, and this difference in the understanding 
of Being reveals itself in everyday facets of lives of the people that live during those epochs. In 
tracing these epochs, Heidegger is tracing the change in the meaning of isness over time. 
Examining the epochs allows for an understanding of Heidegger’s diagnosis of our current 
epoch.  
 
He begins in Greece during the time of Homer. For the people of this place and time, to be was 
to come into being, and then fade out of it. We can look back to the discussion of moods for an 
example of this. Moods come about, linger for a while, and then fade away. Athletic 
performances, banquets, the seasons, and several other important events in the Homeric Greeks’ 
lives, all revealed themselves as coming into being, and then fading out of it.  
 
Later, the Greeks begin to understand being in such a way as to warrant Heidegger positing a 
new epoch. The Greeks move from understanding being as things coming into it, then sliding 
out, to an understanding of being as poiesis. In this epoch, rather than things coming in and going 
out of being, things have to be brought into being. Craftsmen, cooks, and great readers do this 
quite well. Excellent cooks are able to bring things out of the food that would otherwise remain 
hidden. Craftsmen have the skill to bring art out of stone, and great readers are able to find 
meaning in texts that would otherwise be hidden. Poiesis is the nurturing which allows things to 
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come into being and show themselves. For example, Michelangelo brought David from out of 
the marble he would otherwise have been hidden in.  
 
Moving then to the Romans, we find a turn from this idea of nurturing and bringing things into 
being, to an idea of being that revolves around powerful imposition. Being is not brought out in 
things; rather, being is imposed onto things. We can look to the Roman cities and roads for 
example. Order was imposed onto the society, forcing the structures and organization to exist in 
a way they saw fit. 
 
Christianity follows the Roman idea of imposing being and goes a step further. No longer is it 
the human being that imposes being onto objects, but God himself. God imposes order onto 
everything because he is the creator of everything. The idea of the divine right of kings comes 
from the Christian understanding of being. God has placed everything in the proper order. Kings 
do what kings do, and are kings, because God has ordered it that way. From kings we can work 
our way down through the different lords, to the peasants, to animals, plants, and even minerals 
and elements.  
 
From Christianity, we moved to the modern age, and with this, being came to be understood as 
the breaking down of barriers that the world presented. Things came into being when that which 
opposed human will was dominated. This was the age of exploration and scientific advances. 
Oceans were sailed and truths revealed by science.  
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Finally, Heidegger argues, we have arrived at an age where being is understood technologically. 
In our current age, everything is interconnected and all meaningful distinction has been shunned, 
except for the pseudo distinction of efficiency. Maximum efficiency has become the standard 
upon which all being is measured. All aspects of our lives, from the houses we live in to the 
things available on the market, have become standardized in order to allow for efficient living. 
While Heidegger argues that there are great benefits to technology, it saves us from having to do 
many tedious tasks, there is a danger to the efficiency provided by technology.  
 
The ability to get through life without having to develop much skill is provided by technology, 
but is very seductive and is one of the dangers Heidegger sees hiding within a technological 
understanding of the world. Technology allows one to make food without being a chef, and to 
hear music without having to play an instrument. So while this new epoch discloses being in an 
important and different way than the previous epochs, it is dangerous because it allows for one to 
not develop skills, and without the mastery of thing like tools, food, and instruments, being will 
remain hidden in ways that it otherwise would not have been.
19
 
 
Without the skill to use a hammer, the hammer will never reveal itself to you as it actually is. 
You will be able to see the color and structure of the hammer, but in order for the tool to reveal 
itself as itself, one must have the skill to use the hammer in order to provide the space required 
for its coming into being. Skill, however, has been overshadowed by the efficiency of 
technology, and the word has been organized as a system in which things are just cogs in the 
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wheel house. All cogs are replaceable, if another cog comes along that is able to do the job more 
efficiently. 
 
It is in this age that we have developed an understanding of the world as containing objects from 
which we can create useful things; in this epoch we begin to enframe [Ge-stell] the world. It is 
by seeing the world as useful things, or potentially useful thing (or means to ends) that makes 
technology. Modern technology (which we can understand to be technology beginning in the 
industrial age and continuing ever since) reveals things in a particular way, namely as ‘standing-
reserve’ [Bestand]. This way of understanding technology stands in contrast with the way human 
beings have understood the world in the past. For the Greeks, things are according to their own 
nature, and in the Middle Ages, things are the way they were divinely created to be. Standing-
reserve, however, treats things as things waiting to be used by human beings. Heidegger explains 
this by describing the modern understanding of coal: “it is on call, ready to deliver the sun’s 
warmth that is stored in it.”20 In his book, Heidegger’s Later Writings, Lee Braver describes 
what Heidegger means by ‘standing-reserve’: 
  
 All machines share the function of standing ready, waiting to fulfill our desires. The 
 dishwasher crouches in the corner, waiting to spring into action the moment I want my 
 dishes cleaned.  And the water and electricity it requires must constantly stand at the edge 
 of the faucet and socket, leaning forward in anticipation of service... the more I have to 
 adapt my behavior to machines instead of the reverse... the worse the technology.
21
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Before modern technology, the wind had to be blowing if one was to use the winds energy, and 
the speed at which a water mill could grind grain depended on how fast the river was running. 
The great innovation of modern technology is the ability to store electricity, an energy that can 
be used in countless useful ways. Our desires use to be at the mercy of nature, but now we have 
conquered nature in such a way that its fruits are at our disposal.  
 
Acquiring the ability to place nature on reserve has formed our modern understanding of the 
world. No longer do we see the Rhine River as a majestic part of nature. We see it as a source of 
hydroelectric power waiting for someone to harvest and store its energy. In understanding the 
world in such a way, we have learned to imagine ourselves as a part from nature, as opposed to a 
part of it. In removing ourselves in such a way, we no longer feel at home in the world. ‘World’ 
has become a department store shelf that I can pick from whenever I need to, and remove myself 
from whenever I wish.  
 
Heidegger explains that this technological understanding, or technological enframement, has 
infected civilization. If I am to make more machines and live more efficiently, I have to continue 
and expand my view of the world as a bundle of resources, waiting for me to call upon them and 
use them. “Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over and against 
us.”22 A technological understanding of the world reaches beyond how one sees nature. That is, 
we have begun to place more things on the shelf than just natural resources. This is evident from 
the phrase ‘human resource’. If we are to maximize the utility of the world, we must also place 
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ourselves and others on reserve. Heidegger explains: “The forester who measures the felled 
timber in the woods and who to all appearances walks the forest path in the same way his 
grandfather did is today ordered by the industry that produces commercial woods, whether he 
knows it or not.”23  So not only do we understand nature to be standing-reserve, but also human 
beings.  
 
Society is structured in such a way as to turn individuals into replaceable apparatuses. No longer 
does one have to know the ins and outs of woodworking to build a table, or even a house for that 
matter, but only has have knowledge of a very small part of the process. The idea that this 
economic model is efficient because the vast majority of the population can fill any factory 
position because there is such little knowledge and training required to fill one spot on the 
assembly line.  This economic model is of course extremely efficient, but the efficiency is the 
result of understanding people as an exchangeable means of production.  
 
The real danger in a technological enframement of the world is when individuals surrender all 
the other ways of revealing the world, except for the technological. “It is precisely in enframing,” 
explains Heidegger, “which threatens to sweep man away into ordering as the supposed way of 
revealing, and so thrusts man into the danger of the surrender of his free essence.”24 Heidegger 
does not recommend that we abandon the essence of technology, but that we understand it as 
only one way of revealing. One ought to pay heed to the essence of technology, but to eliminate 
it would be to eliminate a way of revealing.  
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In the final pages of The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger discusses a bit of the 
history of the word ‘technology’. “There was a time when it was not technology alone that bore 
the name technē. Once that revealing that brings forth truth into the splendor of radiant 
appearance was also called technē.”25 Art use to be considered technē. This was because art 
brings things into revealing. The highest form of technē, the form of art that best brings things 
into the open and makes them present, is poetry. It is these final pages that push us closer to an 
understanding of Heidegger’s path towards language that he has been clearing since Being and 
Time.  
 
A concern for the forgetfulness of Being is as central in this essay as it is in Being and Time. 
Heidegger spends time in The Question Concerning Technology warning us of the danger of a 
technological essence because of the way it reveals the beings of the world as enframed. This, 
however, is not the greatest danger. The greatest danger is only admitting to a technologically 
enframed world. Eliminating this enframement, a task that Heidegger does not think is even 
possible, is harmful because in eliminating a technological enframement, we lose beings in so far 
as they are reveled through the essence of technology.  
 
In Being and Time Heidegger meticulously examines Dasein. We are walked through several of 
the aspects of Dasein that make Dasein the particular kind of being that it is. It is explained in 
detail what it means for Dasein to be a being that cares. The Question Concerning Technology 
pushes this task forward by discussing how it is that the world and the other is revealed to 
Dasein. This essay delves deeper into examining how it is that Dasein is with-in-the-world.  
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 The essay ends with a description of a line taken from one of Holderline’s late poems. 
“...poetically man dwells...” describes what Heidegger has come to understand as the way Dasein 
is in-the-world. After thoughtfully placing these words back into the poem from which they 
came, we get a more robust understanding of what the poet is bringing into the open.  
 
Full of merit, yet poetically, man 
      Dwells on this earth. 
 
We can feel Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein being pulled towards the poetic by this 
sentence. Heidegger, in fact, takes Holderline’s words for the title of his essay “... Poetically 
Man Dwells...”  
 
In “... Poetically Man Dwells...” Heidegger arrives at what Dasein, being a poetic being, means. 
He does this by opening up the words of Holderline’s poem in a way that allows the poet himself 
to discuss poetic dwelling. Heidegger lets the poem speak. “Poetry”, explains Heidegger, “does 
not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it and hang over it. Poetry is what first 
brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, and thus brings him into dwelling.”26 Being 
and Time explains that one is always already in-the-world, but it is the later essays, such as the 
one we are discussing here, that delve more deeply into how Dasein actually is in-the-world. 
Poetically, argues Heidegger, is the way in which human beings inhabit the world. Poetry opens 
the space between earth and the heavens. It is this space in which Dasein dwells.  
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Before we move any further with what Heidegger understands to be the role of poetry for human 
beings, we must examine a few of the concepts Heidegger employees. Specifically we will have 
to explain the title of the essay “...Poetically Man Dwells...”. Poetry is part of language. 
Heidegger draws a distinction between language and poetry only to emphasize that poetry is the 
highest form of language. Language is a nexus of possibility and disclosure. And it is in enacting 
language through naming, that we, as human beings, bring being into view. In the way that the 
sculptor is able to see the statue within the marble, and then bring it out of the marble, human 
beings bring things out of language through naming. The best sculptors of language are of course 
the poets. In the same way that the best sculptor is able to most fully bring to light what is within 
the marble, the best poet is able to bring into being that which the poem is about. Marble, for the 
sculpture, is a nexus of possible sculptures, a good sculptor is able to give voice to the marble 
and provide the space for it to come into its ownmost being. This is what the poet does in 
naming. She provides a space for the thing she names in the naming.  
 
Heidegger is quick to address the obvious rebuttal that, while poets may in fact dwell poetically, 
how is it that all human beings dwell poetically? In what sense are our days, which are filled 
with work and struggle for success, poetic at all? Part of this objection comes about from 
improperly limiting the poet’s words. If we attend the phrase in question closely, we see that 
there is no specific date which Holderline is asserting man dwells in poetically. That is, we 
should not understand the poet to be arguing that today, as opposed to some other day, is the time 
in which poetic dwelling takes place.  
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This examination of ‘poetic’ does not get us much closer to clarity however. In fact it may even 
further muddy the waters. And the elimination of the idea that this dwelling poetically is tied to 
any specific time in history, or time of day, does not deliver an answer to either of the questions 
above.  
 
In order to open the poetic phrase, Heidegger evokes the etymology of the Greek word poiesis. 
“Making, in Greek, is poiesis”27. In dwelling, then, human beings are creating. Moreover, as we 
have already learned, this creating does not occur within the imagination of the poet. This 
creating takes place between the heavens and earth. For Holderline and Heidegger, it is this 
creating, or making, which allows us to dwell; “poetry first causes dwelling to be a dwelling.”28 
This phrase is what Heidegger asserts as the meaning of “poetically man dwells”.  
 
But what is it that Holderline speaks of when he speaks of dwelling?  Now with an 
understanding of the poetic to be a sort of making, we begin to see the poets phrase as meaning 
something closer to “in creating, man dwells upon this earth”. In explaining Dasein’s dwelling, 
in which the creation is undertaken, Heidegger tells us that “When Hölderlin speaks of dwelling, 
he has before his eyes the basic character of human existence.”29 This idea of dwelling has 
shown itself throughout Being and Time and The Question Concerning Technology. In Being and 
Time it is tied to the idea of being-in. “‘In’ stems from innan-, to live, habitate, to dwell [original 
emphasis].”30 Heidegger continues by explaining that the phrase “I am”, by its very nature, 
means “I dwell”. Being is the infinitive of “I am” and, understood existentially, ‘being’ means 
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dwelling near. “Being-in is thus the formal existential expression of the being of Dasein which 
has the essential constitution of being-in-the-world [original emphasis].”31  
 
We can see from this quote, when we compare it to the quote from “...Poetically Man Dwells...” 
which lays forth the idea that dwelling is the basic character of human existence, that 
Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein as being-in-the-world is an ever occurring theme 
throughout Being and Time and his later works. “Das Wohnen aber ist der Grundzung des Sein, 
demgemäß die Sterblichen sind [original emphasis].”32 This quote from Vorträge und Aufsätze 
(Lectures and Essays) tells us exactly what we want to hear form Heidegger. “Dwelling, 
however, is the fundamental characteristic of Being, in keeping with which mortals exist.”33 
Dasein, the being which is towards death, the mortal being, has at its root this concept of 
dwelling. This sentiment is expressed continuously throughout Heidegger’s writings. Through 
the decades in which Heidegger worked, the idea became more and more refined, and the project 
itself never swayed far from its path. We see, in Being and Time, the phenomenological 
description of Dasein as being-in. It is also in this book that Heidegger links ‘being-in’ to 
‘dwelling’. This idea of Dasein and dwelling is further explored in the later works. In this further 
exploration, the understanding of dwelling is not to be understood as being anything excessively 
different than the dwelling posited as Dasein’s being-in. Rather, it is best understood as the 
continuation of the phenomenological description of Dasein as being-in, or as dwelling.  
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While it is clear that the idea of dwelling has developed throughout Heidegger’s work. Dwelling 
boils down into a codependent relationship with poetic creation. To be human is to be-with and 
to be-in-the-world. It is poetry which allows us to undertake this dwelling in-the-world. Dwelling 
opens the space and poetry makes the space home. “Poetry is what lets us dwell.”34 It is poetry 
which lets human beings undertake the task of dwelling, which is the fundamental characteristic 
of Dasein. In other words, it is poetry that allows us to be-in-the-world in a particularly human 
way.  
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CHAPTER IV  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Authenticity and language 
What we might call the dominant approach to understanding the relationship between language 
and the individual is what Heidegger spends the latter part of his career theorizing against. The 
dominant approach understands language as a tool that human beings have developed. This 
approach removes the individual from language, placing language in reserve. Through 
understanding language as a tool, the dominant school of thought sees it as the mechanism we, as 
individuals, use to express wants and desires, and as the medium through which we describe the 
world. Heidegger flips this relationship, placing language above individuals. He argues that 
language is the master of individuals, and that when we look to the essence of language, we find 
that it is neither “expression nor an activity of man.”35 He explains that viewing language as a 
tool is insufficient if we are to seek the nature of language. The guiding proposition in 
Heidegger’s understanding of the relationship between language and the individual is ‘Language 
speaks’.  It is only in so far as the individual is able to access the speaking of language that she is 
able to speak herself. Human beings answer to the call of language, according to Heidegger. It 
does seem however, that language is somewhat indebted to mortals even in Heidegger’s 
understanding of the relationship. “Mortal speech is a calling that names”36, and it is through this 
naming that mortals bring things in to the world. Without the mortal, language would not be able 
to name.  
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The importance of the mortal to language, because of the ability of the mortal to name, does not 
give any independence or power over language to the individual. This naming only occurs as a 
response to language by the individual. So, the creation of great poetry is not so much attributed 
to a mastery of language by the author, but it is rather attributed to the authors listening and 
responding to language. This relationship, while the mortal is important, is still a master-slave 
relationship.  
 
It is through accessing language that individuals become authentic, and are for this reason 
dependent on language. The individual expands and develops language, which makes language 
dependent upon individuals. This codependency carries with it an intricacy between language 
and the individual which makes it the case that any malady of party results in a malady of the 
other. In one direction this is a simple tragedy, in the other it is a more complicated one. If there 
is a malady of the individual, then language would suffer in that it would not develop or become 
more authentic itself. For example, if Shakespeare had not learned to write, or if Bach had not 
learned to compose, then language would have suffered a great deal. If, on the other hand, there 
is a malady of language, the individual will not be able to access it, and as a result the individual 
will be unable to develop their authenticity or individuality. Access to language is vital to the 
authenticity of the individual because, as Heidegger says, “only speech enables man to be the 
living being he is as man.”37 It is through language that one finds themselves and develops their 
thoughts, understandings, and dispositions.   
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‘Degradation’ is what we will call the malady of language, and this degradation manifest itself in 
two distinct ways. Morality, the first of these manifestations, has cleansed language in such a 
way that there are certain parts of language that are off limits to the individual. We are told, by 
morality, that we ought not to partake in certain expressions of language. Examples of this are 
wide in their breadth. It is considered impolite (a lower form of immorality) to discuss politics or 
money at the dinner table. There are certain constraints on what is appropriate for an academic 
paper, there is a criterion on which I am to base my clothing choice, and morality has even taught 
us to feel shame if certain topics arise during our internal discussions.  
 
What is not placed off limits by morality may be placed in reserve by the technological 
understanding of the world that has been bestowed upon us by modernity.  This technological 
enframenment was discussed in depth in the discussion of The Question Concerning Technology 
a few pages ago. The way in which technology opened humanity to seeing rivers, coal, oil, and 
entire forests as reserves waiting to be used as sources of energy has concurred our 
understanding of the world to such an extent that we now see everything in such a way, even 
language. Language is in reserve, waiting to be plucked from when the time comes.  
 
When Hannah Arendt covered the trial of Adolf Eichmann, she brought to her reader’s attention 
the idea that Eichmann had little access to his mother tongue. He spoke in clichés, picking 
phrases that roughly fit into the conversation. The morality of the Nazi regime had turned 
Eichmann into a being that was unable to authentically participate in language. His inability to 
contribute to language and develop his own dialogue was one of the side effects Eichmann 
suffered while under the spell of the totalitarian government’s moral preachings. With a 
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dogmatic system, such as religion or totalitarianism, morality is able to gain a secure foothold. In 
a structure that does not allow contributions or redactions (you cannot change the Ten 
Commandments), one is forced to pick from the language already available. Eichmann did not 
feel guilt for his involvement in the development of the final solution because the Nazi dogma, 
which was his only source of language, did not have in reserve the option to think the final 
solution was a thing for which one should feel guilt.  
 
Why is morality the culprit behind the degradation of language rather than dogma or 
totalitarianism? Because, morality is the overarching, and legitimizing, structure of things such 
as dogma and totalitarianism. Dogma and totalitarianism merely carry out the bidding of the 
system of morals. Christianity, like totalitarian regimes, traces its preaching back to an inherent 
moral code. It is in the axiom of morality that religions, oppressive governments, and other 
institutions secure their preachings. Morality is not to be questioned, and it is because of this that 
it is so effective at convincing one that certain clothes, music, art, literature, sexualities, and 
dietary choices are wrong in a deep and unalterable way.   
 
Modernity has brought with it technologies that allow the human race to harvest and store the 
energy of the earth.  This ability has become a habit. Rivers, forests, wind, and the sun are 
understood not as entities of beauty or things in their own right. The earth and its bounty is 
measured by the amount of energy that can be harvested from it. The world has been put in 
reserve, to be used as the human race sees fit. This habit of placing our world in reserve expands 
to beyond the world of materials. We have put language in reserve as well, as a store from which 
we take what we need. When the individual places the earth in reserve she removes herself from 
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it. She turns the world into a store of energy rather than a dwelling. This removal also occurs 
when one places language in reserve. We step outside of language and, like Eichmann, pluck 
from the store of language when we are in need. In removing oneself from language, the 
individual loses their ability to dwell within language, and because it is only through language 
that an individual can live authentically, the removal of oneself from language stunts 
authenticity.  
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